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Abstract—The security of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
has a direct reliance on secure and efficient key management.
This leaves key management as a fundamental research topic
in the field of WSNs security. Among the proposed key
management schemes for WSNs security, LEAP (Localized
Encryption and Authentication Protocol) has been regarded
as an efficient protocol over the last years. LEAP supports the
establishment of four types of keys. The security of these keys
is under the assumption that the initial deployment phase is
secure and the initial key is erased from sensor nodes after
the initialization phase. However, the initial key is used again
for node addition after the initialization phase whereas the
new node can be compromised before erasing the key. A time-
based key management scheme rethought the security of LEAP.
We show the deficiency of the time-based key management
scheme and proposed a key management scheme for multi-
phase WSNs in this paper. The proposed scheme disperses the
damage resulting from the disclosure of the initial key. We show
it has better resilience and higher key connectivity probability
through the analysis.
Keywords-Key management, key predistribution, Wireless
Sensor Networks(WSNs);
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have gained wide
applications ranging from civilian to military use. A typical
WSN is composed of a great number of sensor nodes. These
sensor nodes have limited battery power, weak data pro-
cessing capability and short radio range. Most importantly,
sensor nodes are often randomly spread out over specific
regions and work in unattended environment. They are prone
to all kinds of attacks thus security becomes the first concern.
In order to keep communication secure, sensitive data should
be encrypted and authenticated. Therefore, key management,
which is a prerequisite of encryption and authentication,
should be addressed carefully.
Among all the key management mechanisms for WSNs,
key pre-distribution mechanism provides a nice tradeoff
between storage overhead and processing power, and is
considered as the most suitable mechanism for WSNs.
However, most of key predistribution schemes consider a
homogeneous topology and only support the establishment
of pairwise keys. Even though homogeneous networks are
simple and efficient for small network scale, such networks
lack scalability due to ”one-affect-n” effect in node addition
and revocation. In a hierarchical WSN, the effect of node
addition and revocation can be localized into a cluster thus
scalability is achieved.
In a hierarchical WSN (HWSN), various types of com-
munication may happen. The base station broadcasts control
commands to the whole network. Control node multicasts
messages within the cluster. A node communicates with its
neighboring nodes by unicasting. Therefore, network-wide
key, cluster key, and pairwise key are required to satisfy
different types of secure communication. Zhu et al. [1]
devised a scheme called localized encryption and authentica-
tion protocol (LEAP) for hierarchical WSNs. LEAP supports
establishment of individual keys, pairwise keys, cluster keys,
and a global key. Different keys are used to handle the
different types of packets. The security of all types of
keys relys on that of the initial key. As many existing key
management protocols, LEAP assumes that the initial key
is secure during the initialization phase and is erased from
the memory of sensor nodes when the initialization phase
finishes. The authors regarded the scheme is secure under
such an assumption. However, the same key should be used
again for node addition and replacement. According to the
assumption, some new nodes may be captured at any time
after the initialization phase. That is, the new deployed nodes
could be captured before removing the initialization key. The
security of the scheme is threatened by the attacks launched
after the initialization phase.
Jang et al. [2] improved LEAP by introducing a time-
based key management protocol. The scheme strengthens
the security with a new notion of probabilistic time intervals.
However, the scheme does not guarantee the perfect key con-
nectivity. In addition, the pairwise key does not exclusively
belong to the two end nodes. Those nodes which have the
same initial key or master key can calculate the other nodes’
pairwise keys as the ID of each node is public. To address
these security and performance issues, we present an elegant
key management scheme in this paper.
This paper is organized as follows: We describe the LEAP
protocol [1] and the time-based key management scheme
in [2] and then talk about the security problems of them
in Section II. We propose a key management protocol for
multiphase hierarchical WSNs in Section III. We analyze its
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performance and security in Section IV and conclude this
paper in Section V.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. Key Predistribution Schemes
Eschenauer et al. proposed the pioneering work [3]. It is a
random key predistribution scheme. Initially a large key pool
of P symmetric keys and their identities are generated. Each
sensor randomly draws k(k  P ) keys from the key pool
without replacement. These k keys and their identities form
the key-chain for a sensor node. In the shared-key discovery
phase, two neighbor nodes exchange and compare the list
of identities of keys in their key-chains. If two sensors have
at least one key in common, they can setup a secure link
directly. Otherwise, the path-key establishment procedure is
triggered to setup a link between two neighbors. The nodes
still can establish a secure channel under the help of one
or more intermediate nodes. The advantage of the random
key predistribution scheme is that there is no computational
overhead to generate pairwise keys between sensor nodes.
The main shortcoming of the scheme in [3] is that a large
number of keys could be disclosed by compromising a few
nodes. The basic scheme in [3] was further improved by
Chan et al. in [4] from two different aspects. Two variations
are proposed: the q(q ≥ 2)-composite scheme and the multi-
path key reinforcement scheme. The variations make it more
difficult to compromise a node.
The schemes [3] and [4] share a common shortcoming.
That is, they only explore the way to establish the pairwise
keys between nodes but not other types of keys. Obviously,
it is not enough for different communication manners in
HWSNs. In addition, both of [3] and [4] allow dynamic
addition, however, their key pools do not evolve with time.
As a result, if the network encounters a long-term attack,
the newly deployed nodes may be preloaded with some
already compromised keys. It is possible to discover all the
keys in the key pool if an attacker continues his/her attack.
One naive countermeasure is to refresh key pool when some
nodes are added to the network. The attacker cannot deduce
the key ring of the newly deployed nodes with the knowledge
of the key materials of the compromised nodes. However,
this renewal introduces unexpected consequences. That is,
sensor nodes deployed at different time slots cannot establish
pairwise keys because they do not have the common initial
key. How to achieve connectivity between nodes deployed
at different time slots in a dynamically renewed key pool is
an open problem to be answered.
To the best of our knowledge, RoK [8] is the first key
predistribution scheme adapted to multiphase WSNs. In
this scheme, sensor nodes which run out of power will
be removed from the network and new sensor nodes need
to be periodically deployed to assure network connectivity.
Correspondingly, the predistributed keys have limited life-
times and the key pool should be refreshed periodically.
This scheme overcomes the drawback of the general key
predistribution schemes. [3] [4]. The security of the network
does not degrade with time. Zo-RoK [9] takes advantage of
prior deployment knowledge in order to reduce the size of
key ring. In this way, the resiliency of the network against
node capture attacks increases with a smaller key ring of
each node. However, deployment knowledge is not always
available in WSNs. Lately, a random generation material
(RGM) key predistribution scheme was proposed in [5]. In
this scheme, the lifetime of the whole network is divided
into generations. Each generation has its own random keying
material and pairwise keys are established by two nodes is
only known by the nodes in two generations which the two
nodes belong to. Nodes deployed in other generations other
than the two generations which the nodes belong to have no
access to the pairwise key. We lend this idea to improve the
performance of the LEAP scheme in this paper.
B. LEAP
Zhu et al. [1] devised a key management scheme which is
abbreviated as LEAP for hierarchical WSNs. LEAP offers
establishment methods of individual keys, pairwise keys,
cluster keys, and a global key. Different keys are used to
handle the different types of packets. The establishment of
cluster keys and the global key mainly depends on the the
established pairwise keys, so we omit the establishment of
them here and focus on the description of the establishment
of pairwise keys.
• Individual key: This is an unique key that is shared
between the base station and each sensor node [1]. The
key is preloaded into each node’s memory before being
deployed. The individual key is calculated as Kmu =
fKm(u) where f is a pseudo-random function and Km
is the system key known only to the base station and
u represents the ID of the node u.
• Pairwise key: Each node shares a pairwise key with
each of its immediate neighbors. Similar to the scheme
in [3], there are four stages of pairwise key establish-
ment: key predistribution, neighbor discovery, pairwise
key establishment, and key erasure. During the initial
stage of key predistribution, node u is loaded with a
initial key IK by the controller and drives the master
key Ku = fIK(u). For neighbor discovery, node u
first initialize a timer to activate during a time slot of
Tmin, then it broadcasts a HELLO message contain-
ing its ID to discover its neighbors. The neighboring
node v responds to node u with an acknowledgement
(ACK) message containing its ID if it receives node u’s
HELLO message. The ACK message of v is authenti-
cated using its master key Kv which is derived from
IK. Node u verifies the Message Authentication Code
(MAC) of v by generating the master key Kv with IK.
The neighbor discovery stage can be denoted as:
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Figure 1. Key materials preloaded to nodes at different time slots in
scheme [2].
u → ∗ : u;
v → u : v, MAC(Kv, u | v).
In the stage of pairwise key establishment, node u
calculates the pairwise key Kuv shared with node v,
as Kuv = fKv (u). Node v can also derive Kuv in
the same way. Kuv serves as their pairwise key. In
the final stage, when its timer expires after Tmin,
node u erases IK and all the masters keys of its
neighbors, which it computed in the neighbor discovery
stage. Even though an adversary captures a node, the
communication between the captured node and another
node cannot be decrypted without the key IK.
C. The Time-based Key Management Scheme
With the motivation of minimizing the portion of compro-
mised network when the initial key IK is disclosed, Jang et
al. split the lifetime of a sensor network into P time slots and
each time slot is assigned with an initial key. As depicted
in Figure 1, Tj and Nj represent a time slot and a group
of node deployed during that time slot Tj , respectively. If
a node will be deployed at time slot Tj , the sensor node is
preloaded with the initial key IKj and m master keys of
randomly-chosen time slots. Then the newly deployed node
can establish pairwise keys with nodes which are deployed
at same or different time slots. Three situations exist for the
establishment of pairwise keys.
1) All nodes in the same group Nj(1 ≤ j ≤ P ) are able
to establish pairwise keys with each other using the
initial key IKj during the time slot Tj .
2) Then, they are able to establish pairwise keys with
other nodes which are deployed at different time slots,
but have the master key derived from the current initial
key. Suppose u is a node deployed at time slot Tj and
v is a node deployed before Tj . If the node v has
the master key Kvj which is derived from the initial
key IKj for time slot Tj , the node v can compute a
pairwise key Kuv = fKvj (u). The node u is also able
to generate a master key of v, Kvj = fIKj (v).
3) Finally, a pair of sensor nodes that do not share any
keying material but are in wireless communication
range can establish pairwise keys via proxy nodes.
D. The Security Problems of LEAP and The Time-based Key
Management Scheme
As many existing key management protocols, LEAP as-
sumes that sensor nodes are secure during the initialization
phase and can be compromised after the phase. However,
such an assumption could be incorrect. Security of LEAP
mainly depends upon the initial key which is erased from
sensor nodes after the initialization phase. However, the
same initial key IK should be used again for node addition
after that phase while the new node can be captured before
removing the initial key. Therefore, the initial key IK should
never be used for node addition in LEAP after the initial time
Tmin. Different initial keys are used for different time slots
in the time-based key management scheme [2]. The threat
caused by the disclosure of the initial key is eliminated.
However, the key connectivity is constrained by the number
of preloaded master keys m and the order of the current time
slot. If m is far less than the lifetime P of the network, the
key connectivity mP−i is far less than 1 at the time slots
j(j ≤ P/2). On the contrary, if m is close to P , higher
key connectivity can be achieved with heavy burden on
storage. We consider the security problem of the established
pairwise key between two nodes. The pairwise key does not
exclusively belong to the two end nodes. As shown in Figure
2 in [2], Nodes of group N1, N2, and N6 are preloaded with
master key Ku7, the pairwise keys between any two groups
of them are known by the other group. In addition, m master
keys of randomly-chosen time slots are preloaded to the
nodes when they are deployed to the network without taking
the lifetime of nodes into consideration. Suppose a node who
can survive at most Gw time slots is deployed at the j-th
time slot with m master keys of randomly-chosen time slots.
Those master keys of the time slots from (j+Gw)-th to P -th
would never be used. They waste scarce memory of sensor
nodes.
III. OUR CONSTRUCTION
Motivated by the random key predistribution scheme in
[5], we propose a novel key management for multi-phase
hierarchical WSN. In this scheme, the time domain of the
network is split into many time slots. In this paper, we
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call the time slot generation as well. It is assumed that
there are totally P generations. Sensor nodes are usually
powered by battery. It is assumed that a node may live at
most for Gw generations. Each generation has its initial key
which is constructed by a key distribution center. There
is no relation between the initial keys for different time
slots. This property prevent the attackers from concluding
the previous and future initial keys. Wireless sensor network
are set up for longer lifetime as compared to that of sensor
nodes. Therefore, new nodes need to be replenished in some
generations in the case of node capture attack or depletion
of battery to provide continuity of network. It is supposed
that an attacker can get all the key materials stored in the
captured node. In order to achieve connectivity between
nodes belonging to different generations and resiliency, the
keys that are used to establish pairwise keys should evolve
in a different way, independent of evolution of the initial
keys. Table I presents the symbols used in our proposed key
management scheme.
Table I
SYMBOLS USED IN THE PROPOSED KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEME
P The initial key pool size and the whole life time of the
network
KRj The key ring of nodes deployed at generation j
Kjuv Pairwise key between nodes u and v which deployed
at generation j
Kghuv Pairwise key between nodes u which deployed at
generation g and v which deployed at generation
v where 1 ≤ g < h ≤ g + Gw − 1
H(·) Secure hash function
A. Predistribution of Key Materials
In the proposed scheme, as depicted in Figure 2, the group
Gj deployed at generation Tj are assigned with an initial
key IKj and Gw − 1 master keys in order to establish links
with nodes deployed at the same or different generations.
The initial key is reserved for the establishment of secure
communication with nodes deployed in the same generation.
The other Gw − 1 master keys are used to establish secure
links with the groups deployed at subsequent generations.
Different from the time-based key management scheme in
[2], the master keys in our scheme are constructed in an
ingenious way. These master keys are transformed from
the initial keys for the generations within the the node’s
generation window Gw. For a group deployed at generation
j, their sub-keyring S − KRj containing the master keys
for the subsequent generations j + 1 ≤ i < j + Gw − 1, is
given as follows:
S − KRj = {Kj,i|Kj,i = H(IKi ‖ j)}, (1)
where IKi is the initial key for the i-th generation.
”This process ” can be detailed as follows. In order to
form the sub-keyring S−KRj , the key distributor first picks
Figure 2. The key rings preloaded to nodes at different generations.
up Gw−1 initial keys for the subsequent Gw−1 generations.
Each of these keys is appended with the generation number
of the group, which is j, and hashed using a secure hash
function like SHA-1 [6] or SHA-256 [7], depending on the
key size. These hashed values are stored in the sub-keyring.
In this way, we customize the keys belonging to a subsequent
generation to be used in another generation without storing
the actual initial keys, owing to the one-way property of the
secure hash functions.
To sum up, the keyring of a sensor node contains (1) the
initial key assigned to the current generation; (2) the trans-
formed master keys for up to Gw−1 subsequent generations.
More formally, for a node deployed at generation j, its key
ring KRj is shown as follows:
KRj = {IKj ,Kj,j+1, . . . , Kj,j+Gw−1}. (2)
That is, each sensor node stores one initial key and Gw−1
master keys for each upcoming generation. Because a sensor
node may communicate with nodes at most Gw − 1 next
generation, the maximum number of keys in the key ring of
a particular node is Gw.
B. Key Establishment
After the keyring is created, the nodes are deployed over
the sensor field. Two situations exist for the establishment
of pairwise keys.
1) Since all sensor nodes deployed at generation j con-
tain the initial key IKj , they can establish pairwise
keys using IKj . Suppose two nodes u and v belong
to the same generation j, they compute their pairwise
keys as follows:
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• After a node u computes a master key Kju =
fIKj (u), node u broadcasts a HELLO message
with its ID and generation j and then waits for
a response from the neighboring node v which is
deployed in the same generation. Node v sends
node u a response message including its ID and
MAC.
u → ∗ : u, j, nonce;
v → u : v, MAC(Kjv , u | v).
• Both u and v can compute a pairwise key Kjuv =
fKjv (u) = fKju(v).
2) If the two nodes belong to different generations, the
pairwise key creation process is different. Let us
suppose that the node u deployed at generation g and
another node v deployed at generation h(1 ≥ g < h ≤
g + Gw − 1). They computer their pairwise keys as
follows:
Kghuv = fKghv (u) = fKghu (v)
where Kghv = fKgh(v) and K
gh
u = fKgh(u). Node
u is already preloaded with the key Kgh before
deployment. By using this key, node u can calculate
Kghu . However, from the point of view of node v, the
master key Kgh is the master key for the previous
generation g. Therefore, it is not in node v’s keyring.
Fortunately, node v can calculate Kgh. As discussed
in the previous subsection, Kgh = H(IKh ‖ g),
where H is a secure one-way hash function. Node
v is deployed at generation h, and therefore it stores
the initial key IKh. By using IKh, it calculates the
key Kghv and then calculates K
gh
uv .
IV. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Security Analysis
The goal of this section is to evaluate the security of our
proposal and compare it with that of the time-based key
management scheme proposed in [2].
We suppose that when a node is compromised, the key
material stored in the node will be extracted by the adver-
sary. The key material will be utilized to attack the rest
of network. In [2], the resilience of schemes is described
as that the additional portion of network that an adversary
can compromise using the key material obtained from x
compromised nodes. We still use this definition in this
section. The security of the LEAP scheme depends on the
security of the initial key IK. The whole network can
be compromised once the initial key KI is disclosed. The
damage resulting from a disclosure of an initial key IK is
localized by the time-based key management scheme [2].
In order to provide connectivity between nodes deployed at
different generations, the preloaded master key for different
generation is the same. An compromised initial key IKa at
generation Ta only affect the nodes deployed at generation
Ta rather than the whole network. However, as we men-
tioned in Section II, the pairwise key does not exclusively
belong to the two end nodes. If three nodes are preloaded
with the same master key, the pairwise keys between any
two groups of them are known by the other group. Once
a node is captured, the pairwise keys shared by other two
nodes will be compromised as well.
In our scheme, the pairwise key Kghuv exclusively belongs
to the two end nodes. For example, the pairwise key used
between node u deployed at generation g and v deployed at
generation h is confined to the two end nodes deployed at
these two generations. Nodes deployed at generations other
than g and h have no access to this key. This is because
the master key Kgh can be computed by a node if and only
if this node has been deployed at generation h and has an
initial key IKh in its key ring. As a result, a sensor node w,
which is deployed at any other generation l cannot compute
a master key Kgh. Three conditions exist according to the
value of l
• l < h. The node w needs IKh to compute Kgh. Even
though the node w has the master key Klh = H(IKh ‖
l), it cannot derive IKh from Klh due to the one-way
property of the secure hash function H .
• h < l ≤ g + Gw − 1. The node u is preloaded with
the master key Kgl = H(IKl ‖ g) and the node v
is preloaded with the master key Khl = H(IKl ‖ l).
Even the node w can calculate Kgl and Khl, it cannot
derive IKh or Kgh due to the one-way property of the
secure hash function H .
• l > g + Gw − 1. The node u is power off at the
generation l.
It is clear that a master key Kgh is known only by the
nodes of the generation g and h. No node deployed at any
other generation can compute the key that is unique to the
generation g and h. Hence an attacker has to spend extra
effort if s/he wants to acquire the pairwise key between the
nodes u and v that are deployed at the generations g and h,
respectively. This has an advantage over the scheme in [2]
in restricting the information that an attack acquires if s/he
captures a node.
B. Performance Analysis
Key Connectivity. The key connectivity of a group Nt
which is deployed at generation t of the time-based key
management scheme [2] is assessed from two aspects. One is
Nt’s probability of sharing keying materials with prospective
sensor nodes, ppros(t) and the other is the probability of
sharing keying materials with predeployed sensor nodes
and nodes deployed at the current generation Gt, ppre(t).
According to the scheme, when a sensor node is deployed
at generation t, only the predeployed nodes which have
the master key, which is derived from the initial key IKt
of the generation t, can establish pairwise key with it.
Because each node is preloaded with the initial key of the
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Figure 3. The comparison of the probabilities that Nt establishes pairwise
key with prospective groups in our scheme and the scheme in [2].
current generation and m master keys of randomly chosen
generations after deployment, the probability of sharing key
material with other prospective nodes is mP−t where P is
the number of total generations (Please refer to [2] for the
process of calculation). The variation 1 ≤ t < P . When
P − t ≤ m, the master keys of all remaining generations
will be preloaded to the nodes deployed at generation t so
that the key connectivity probability ppros(t) is 1 and keeps
1 for the subsequent generations. We make a comparison
of the probabilities that Nt establishes pairwise key with
prospective groups in our scheme and the scheme in [2] in
Figure 3. In order to facilitate the comparison, we keep the
size of key pool (the same as the number of generations of
a network) 500. The three curves in Figure 3 demonstrate
the conditions of [2] when m equals 100, 150, and 200,
respectively. As shown in the figure, the probability ppros
increases as the index the generation t increases. In our
scheme, the group Nt can always share keying material with
groups in its generation window [t, t + Gw − 1] with 100%
probability. The variation 1 ≤ m ≤ P −1, it is easy to reach
the conclusion that the more master keys a sensor node has
in [2], the higher probability of key connectivity becomes.
In our scheme, more than Gw − 1 preloaded master keys
do not increase the key connectivity probability as Gw − 1
master keys are enough for reaching 100% probability.
In terms of ppre(t), it can be calculated by using ppros.
If we suppose that sensor nodes are uniformly distributed at





where 1 means that a sensor node can establish pairwise
keys with nodes deployed at the same generation with
100% probability. In fact, it is the average value of the
probabilities of key connectivity with each preloaded and
Figure 4. The comparison of the probabilities that Ni establishes pairwise
key with pre-deployed sensors and the sensors being deployed in the same
generation in our scheme and the scheme in [2].
Figure 5. Nodes deployed at generation j can establish pairwise nodes
with at most 2Gw − 1 generations with 100% probability.
the current group of sensor nodes. Figure 4 describes the
change tendency of probability ppre for various m when the
number of generation P is fixed to 500.
Different from the scheme in [2], when a sensor node
is deployed at generation t, it is preloaded with the initial
key IKt and Gw − 1 master keys for the subsequent
Gw − 1 generations. The node can establish pairwise keys
with nodes in at most 2Gw − 1 generations with 100%
probability as long as both of them are still viable. As
described in Figure 5, a node deployed at generation j can
establish pairwise keys with nodes deployed from generation
j −Gw + 1 to generation j by using its initial key IKj and
establish pairwise keys with nodes deployed from generation
j + 1 to generation j + Gw − 1 by using the proloaded
master keys for each generation. In time-based scheme [2],
a node is preloaded with m master keys of randomly- chosen
generations. Some of these master keys might not be used
before the node is power off. Suppose a node is deployed at
generation j and is viable at at most Gw generations, those
master keys of the generations from j+Gw to P are useless.
Storage Overhead. In terms of storage overhead, it is
determined by the memory of a node and generations that
a node can survive. In a practical application of network
deployment model, the beginning of new generation means
the occurrence of node additions Therefore, the number of
generations is approximately equal to the number of node
addition. Therefore, the higher frequency of node additions,
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the larger number of generations a network has. According
to our scheme, a sensor node surviving 100 generations has
to store 100 keys including one initial key and 99 master
keys. These node can establish pairwise keys with nodes in
199 generations with 100% probability. The modern sensor
nodes such as MICA-Z have 128KB program memory,
4KB runtime memory, and 512KB external memory [10].
Suppose the size of a key is 128bits, our scheme requires
only 1.6KB memory. Our scheme has reasonable storage
requirement for modern sensor nodes.
V. CONCLUSION
The LEAP key management mechanism of LEAP is
welcomed due to its multiple keying mechanism. However,
the security of all types of keys is mainly depends on that of
an initial key. It is assumed that the initial deployment phase
is secure and the key is erased from sensor nodes after the
initialization phase. However, the same key should be used
again for node addition after that phase while the new node
can be captured before removing the initial key. A time-
based key management scheme was proposed to eliminate
the effect of disclosure of the initial keys. The time-based
scheme split the time domain of network into many time
slots. Each time slot has its own initial key. This scheme
does disperse the damage resulting from the disclosure of the
initial key. However, the scheme reduces the probability of
key connectivity. In contrast, the proposed scheme in this pa-
per keeps 100% key connectivity within the node’s lifetime
time without degrade security. The established pairwise key
is exclusively known only by the nodes of the generations
which the two end nodes belong to. No node deployed at
other generations can compute the pairwise key.
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